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Personalization  mechanisms  in consumer  e-commerce  allow  for  the adjustment
of the time,  form and manner of contact,  the way of concluding the contract  and
the availability and content of the offer. Subsequently concluded agreements can be
seen as a new phase of development of the consumer transaction model – secondary
individualization replaces standardization. The possibility of concluding contracts
on a massive  scale  is  retained,  but  with  added  granularity  and  flexibility  that
mimic  the individualisation  of transactions.  Special  provisions  for  personalized
contracts are missing on the EU level and within the Polish legal system.
The starting  point  is  an analysis  of the reaction  of the traditional  private
instruments  of Polish  law  towards  the personalization  of offers –  case  law  and
doctrinal approach towards the concept of a standard contract and an individually
negotiated  one  are  examined.  Next,  the pre-contractual  stage  is  investigated –
the personalization  process  is  explored  from  the perspective  of unfair  practices
regulation,  and  the legal  basis  for  the personalization  process  in the context
of the GDPR  is  discussed.  While  Polish  national  law  focuses  on combating
the undesired results of personalization, the EU initiatives aim at granting ex-ante
protection.  The mechanism in directive  2005/29/EC is  being  supplemented  with
an information  protection  mechanism  (consent  requirement).  The limitations
of this model are identified and some alternative solutions are proposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An initial  assumption  of the study  is  that  contracts  concluded  using
personalization  mechanisms1 are  a new  step  in the development
of consumer  contracts.  Private  law  emerged  as an individualised  system,
giving  its  subjects  broad  autonomy  in the contractual  sphere.2 Since
the beginning  of mass  production  in the 19th  century,  the model
of the individual  contract  has  become  obsolete.3 Individually  negotiated
contracts  were  replaced  by unilaterally  formulated  standard  contracts.4
The other  party,  as a rule  being  the weaker  one,  could  either  consent
or resign  from  concluding  a contract.5 In response,  the legislature
introduced protective standards aimed at diminishing the undesired effects
of the growing asymmetries in private relations.6
1 In the paper  broad  understanding  of the term  is  adopted –  it  covers  all  the adjustments
of the content that are perceived by the addressee as adopted individually for him, to match
his  personal  needs.  Personalization  should  not  be  confused  with  customization  in case
of which modification of standard content are introduced by the addressee himself.
2 Mularski,  K.  and  Radwański, Z.  (2019)  Zagadnienia  ogólne  czynności  prawnych.
In: Zbigniew Radwański (ed.).  System prawa prywatnego, 2, Zbigniew Radwański, Andrzej
Olejniczak (eds.). Prawo cywilne – część ogólna. 3rd ed. Warszawa: C.H. Beck, pp. 7–8, 13.
3 Łętowska,  E.  (1974)  Problematyka  ogólnych  warunków  i wzorów  umów  w świetle
poglądów doktryny obcej.  Studia  Prawnicze,  3,  pp. 152–153;  Bednarek,  M. (2013)  Wzorce
umów.  In:  Zbigniew  Radwański (ed.).  System Prawa Prywatnego,  5,  Ewa Łętowska (ed.).
Prawo zobowiązań – część ogólna. 2nd ed. Warszawa: C.H. Beck, pp. 604–605; Pyrzyńska, A.
(2019) In:  Kodeks cywilny. Tom II. Komentarz. Art. 353–626, Maciej  Gutowski (ed.). 2nd ed.
Warszawa: C.H. Beck, Art. 384, point I.1.
4 This  notion  used  in Directive  93/13/EEC  of 5  April  1993  on unfair  terms  in consumer
contracts.  Art. 384–385,  385 (4) of Polish  Civil  Code  (Dz.U.2018.1025)  refer  to the same
phenomenon under the notion of “a contract concluded with the use of standard terms”. Polish
legislator  differentiates  also  contracts  with  unilaterally  imposed  provisions
(art. 385 (1)–385 (3)  PCC).  Hondius,  E.  (1995) The Reception of Directive on Unfair  Terms
in Consumer Contracts by Member States. European Review of Private Law, 3, p. 245; Pyziak-
-Szafnicka,  M.  (1994)  Kilka  uwag  na temat  ochrony  przed  narzucaniem  nieuczciwych
warunków  umowy. Przegląd  Prawa  Handlowego,  9,  p. 1;  Łętowska,  E.  (2004)  Nieuczciwe
klauzule w prawie umów konsumenckich. Warszawa: C. H. Beck, p. 2.
5 Łętowska, E. (1974) Op. cit., pp. 123–124; Bednarek, M. (2005) Wzorce umów w prawie polskim.
Warszawa:  Monografie  Prawnicze,  pp. 10–11;  Mikłaszewicz,  P.  (2008)  Obowiązki
informacyjne  w umowach  z udziałem konsumentów  na tle  prawa  Unii  Europejskiej.  Warszawa,
Kraków: Wolters Kluwer Polska, pp. 211–216.
6 Twigg-Flesner,  C.  (2010)  In:  Hans-W.  Micklitz,  Jules  Stuyck  and Evelyne  Terryn  (eds.).
Cases,  materials  and  Text  on Consumer  Law.  Oxford,  Portland,  Oregon:  Hart  Publishing,
pp. 321–322; Schulze, R. and Zoll,  F. (2018)  European Contract Law. München: C. H. Beck;
Oxford: Hart; Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 153–155; Zoll, F. (2018) Rękojmia. Odpowiedzialność
sprzedawcy. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C. H. Beck, Legalis, Chapter II § 1 point II; Hellwege,
P.  (2018)  Right  of Withdrawal  in Distance  and  Off-Premises  Contracts.  In:  Nils  Jansen,
Reinhard  Zimmermann  (eds.).  Commentaries  on European  contract  laws. Oxford:  Oxford
University Press, pp. 509, 511–513.
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Personalization  technologies  allow  for  the re-individualization
of contracts.  Contracts  are  designed  by the entrepreneur  to match
the individual  characteristics,  preferences  or situation  of the consumer,
which gives him the impression that his relationship with the entrepreneur
is  based  on trust  and  knowledge –  the personalized  contract  model
emerges.  The main  research  questions  are  if and  is  how  does  the legal
system  react  towards  the use  of personalization  algorithms  in shaping
offers?
To avoid presenting fragmentary, distorted analysis the paper is divided
into  three  sections.  In each  one  a regulatory  framework  with  different
methodology approach is discussed – can it be applied, what are the most
problematic issues that emerge during its application and does it fulfil its
aim  in case  of personalized  agreements?  The first  regime  (contract  law
provisions  on standard  contracts7)  provides  protection  by intervening
in the content  of legal  relationship –  ex  post,  by modifying  the final  result
of applying  personalization  techniques  during  pre-contractual  stage.
The second  [norms8 introduced  to national  private  law
as an implementation  of Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive  (UCPD)9]
grants  protection  by setting  requirements  around  the process
of personalization –  it  outlines  rules  on entrepreneurs’  actions  that  lead
to conclusion  of personalized  agreement.  Within  the last  group  of norms
(GDPR10)  information  based  protection  model  is  adopted –  based
on the assumption  that  individuals  (usually  consumers)  are  able  to make
a rational  decision  on consenting  to personalization  if they have  access
to relevant  information.11 The possible  effectiveness  of these  regimes  is
assessed – their weaknesses are identified and possible solution proposed.
7 Art. 384–3854 of PCC.
8 Act  on Competition  and  Consumer  Protection  (Dz.U.2018.798  j.t.)  and  the Act
on Counteracting Unfair Market Practices (Dz.U.2017.2070 j.t.). 
9 Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices  in the internal  market  and  amending  Council  Directive  84/450/EEC,  Directives
97/7/EC,  98/27/EC  and  2002/65/EC  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  and
Regulation  (EC)  No 2006/2004  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council.  Official
Journal of the European Union (2005/L 149/22).
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection  of natural  persons  with  regard  to the processing  of personal  data  and
on the free movement  of such  data,  and  repealing  Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data
Protection  Regulation).  Official  Journal  of the European  Union (L  119/1).  Available  from:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [Accessed 16 September 2019].
11 Busch, C. (2019) Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer
Law and Data Privacy Law. The University of Chicago Law Review, 86 (2), p. 310.
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2. PERSONALIZATION – BETWEEN A STANDARD
AND AN INDIVIDUALLY NEGOTIATED CONTRACT
The starting point of the analysis are the traditional private law instruments
inherent  for  the core  of national  contract  law  [Polish  Civil  Code  (PCC)],
shaped  under  the influence  the EU  legislator  in the last  decade
of 20th century.12 These  norms  allow  for  determination  of the content
of the contractual  relationship  (final  result  of personalization  within
consumer  market).  There  are  no  provisions  that  explicitly  regulate
personalization.  Such  agreement  has  characteristics  typical
of an individually  negotiated  contract,  a unilaterally  imposed  set
of provisions  and a standard  contract.  Each  one  of the aforementioned  is
governed  by a different  set  of norms.  Discrepancies  appear  in regard
to inter alia rules of the incorporation of provisions, their interpretation and
the legal  reaction  towards  the lack  of equivalency  of those  relations.13
Therefore,  qualification  of a personalized  contract  as a standard  contract,
a set  of imposed  provisions  or an individually  negotiated  contract  may
significantly  affect  the position  of the consumer  in the contractual
relationship.  As a result,  it  is  crucial  to determine  under  which  regime
personalized contracts fall. Consequently, despite the fact that PCC does not
recognise  personalized  agreements  as a new  model  of contracting  within
consumer  e-commerce,  the use  of personalization  mechanisms  cannot  be
disregarded at the stage of applying the law.
As a legal  definition  for  a contract  concluded with the use  of standard
terms  is  missing  from  the PCC,14 there  have  been  numerous  attempts
to define these contracts in case law15 and doctrine.16 Definitions of standard
terms  are  based  on the quantitative  premise  (number  of contracts
12 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Official
Journal  of the European  Union (L  95/29).  Available  from:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31993L0013 [Accessed 16 September 2019].
13 Discrepancies appear in regard to: rules on whether behaviour of the parties  can be seen
as reaching  consensus  as to the inclusion  of certain  elements  to the legal  relationship,
possibility  of interpretation  of the content  of contract  in accordance  with  legitimate
expectations  against  the wording  of the contract,  requirements  to successfully  set
the characteristics of the subject of contract as being below the standard quality, the binding
power of provisions that shape rights and duties of one party in a manner contrary to good
practices with gross violation of his interests.
14 Rejdak,  M.  (2005)  Definicja  terminu  „wzorzec  umowy  konsumenckiej”. Ruch  Prawny,
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, LXVII (3), p. 116.
15 Judgement  of Constitutional  Tribunal  (8.12.2003),  K  3/02,  OTK-A 2003/9/99;  judgements
of Polish  Supreme Court:  (5.09.1991)  III  CZP 75/91,  OSNC 1992/5/  67;  (7.07.2005)  V CK
855/04, PUG 2005/10, p. 33; (26.03.2010) I CSK 444/09 Legalis no 362191; (20.07.2017) I CSK
704/16, Legalis no 1668805; (1.03.2017), IV CSK 285/16, LEX no 2308321.
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concluded)  or the objective  premise  (normative  provisions  regarding
the scope of business or professional activity of the entrepreneur). Yet, these
distinction prove to be unsuitable when assessing whether a personalized
contract may constitute a standard one. It is reasonable to use descriptive
definitions based on the enumeration of the standard terms features.
Standard  terms  in Polish  law  are  (2.1.)  a set  of provisions  prepared
unilaterally by one party (2.2.) used for mass contracting (2.3) which shapes
the content of these contracts in a uniform way.
2.1. A SET OF PROVISIONS PREPARED UNILATERALLY BY ONE 
PARTY
The authorship of the contract template is considered irrelevant. A standard
contract  can  be  written  by the entrepreneur  in persona,  by a third  party
or compiled  automatically  by an electronic  system.  Thus,  the fact  that
the customer  profiling  or compilation  of contractual  provisions  is
automated, without the actual participation of an entrepreneur, or in a way
chosen by him (electronic agents),  is  irrelevant when assessing the nature
of contracts.
The unilateral  nature of the standard contract is  understood as the lack
of influence of the other party on its content. However, personalization can
be  performed  only  if at least  one  of prerequisites  of Art. 6  GDPR  is
fulfilled –  typically,  if the consumer  agreed  to profiling  in advance.17
The modus  operandi of personalization  mechanisms  depends
on the entrepreneur,  but  the amount  and  content  of data  processed  is
a derivative of consumer behaviour. Thus,  the consumer, through specific
behaviours,  can  prevent  the use  of personalization  or influence
the personalization data through appropriate actions.18
In the case of personalized contracts, there are no negotiations between
the entrepreneur  and  the customer.  The adjustment  of the content  takes
place before making an offer. The use of personalization mechanisms leads
16 Łętowska,  E.  (2002)  Prawo umów konsumenckich.  2nd ed. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H.
Beck,  p. 320;  Rejdak,  M.  (2005)  Op.  cit., p. 127;  Bednarek,  M.  (2013)  Op.  cit.,  p. 596;
Radwański, Z. and Olejniczak, A. (2018) Zobowiązania: część ogólna. 13th ed. Warszawa: C. H.
Beck, p. 144.
17 The issue discussed in: 4. Initiation of the personalization process.
18 When the model of consumers’ strategic behaviour is used, the risk of data manipulation
skyrockets. See a case of calculating creditworthiness based on the fact that people who buy
furniture pads to protect their floors are considered trustworthy debtors. Duhigg, C. (2009)
What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?  The New York Times Magazine.
[online] Available  from:  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html
[Accessed 12 December 2018].
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to the formation  of individual  contractual  clauses  in advance,  which
excludes the possibility of the other party's influence on their content. There
is  no  room  for  subsequent  modifications  in this  model.  Nevertheless,
the content  of the offer  depends  on the individual  characteristics
of the consumer –  it  is  shaped  to correspond  with  them.  The consumer's
characteristics  and  expectations  (explicitly  or implicitly  expressed
in the data that is  used during personalization process)  should, therefore,
have a substantial impact on the content of the contract.
Lack of dialogue  at the pre-contractual  stage may be  seen  as the effect
of using effective tools to adapt the offer to the client's needs. The purpose
of personalization  is,  after  all,  to enhance  the consumer’s  trust  towards
the entrepreneur.19 The need  to negotiate  in order  to adapt  the offer
to the consumer's  requirements  disappears,  because  it  is  shaped  based
on his profile.
The use  of personalization  mechanisms  should  lead  to the same  effect
as individual negotiations. However, it should be emphasized that the use
of profiling  and  personalization  does  not  automatically  mean
individualization  of each  of the potential  clients.  These  tools  allow  for
shaping  marketing  practices,  including  offers,  to give  the consumer
the impression  of an individual  relationship  with  the entrepreneur.
In the case  of segmentation-based  personalization,20 such  an individual
relationship  does not  arise – it  is  only imitated.  In addition,  the fact  that
provisions are individually designed does not automatically mean that they
should be qualified as individually negotiated. Unilaterality means there is
a lack of negotiation, not of individual approach.21
Therefore,  the premise  of unilaterality  should  be  understood  strictly
as the lack of dialogue between the parties, and personalized contracts can
be considered unilaterally shaped by the entrepreneur.
19 Borocz, I. (2015) Clash of Interests – Is Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination in Line with
the GDPR.  Studia  Iuridica  Auctoritate  Universitatis  Pecs  Publicata,  153 (37),  p. 42.  Use
of personalization makes it possible to build trust based on individualisation. Komiak, Sh.
and  Benbasat,  I.  (2006)  The Effects  of Personalization  and  Familiarity  on Trust  and
Adoption  of Recommendation  Agents.  MIS  Quarterly,  30 (4),  pp. 941–960.  However,  it
should  be  noted  that  personalization  of certain  elements  such  as price  might  lead
to opposite  effects.  Furner,  Ch.  P.,  Serino,  C.  M.  and Smatt,  C.  Making  it  personal:  How
personalization  affects  trust  over  time.  [online]  Available  from: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/1385576/ pp. 8–9 [Accessed 1 May 2019].
20 Firstly  customers  are  grouped  together  according  to identifiable  characteristics  (e.g. age,
geography, gender, favourite brand) and then the content is adjusted to match each group.
21 Rzetecka-Gil, A. (2011)  Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz. Zobowiązania - część ogólna. LEX no 8853,
Art. 3851, point 22.
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2.2. USED FOR MASS CONTRACTING
Emphasis  is  placed  on the function  of standard  terms – they  serve
the proposer  to conclude  contracts.  However,  it  is  not  specified  whether
these  provisions  concern  only  the rights  and  obligations  of the parties
in the contract,22 or also  the norms  governing  the conduct
of the entrepreneur  within  the scope  of his  professional  activity
(personalization, marketing methods, etc.). According to the latter, to fulfil
the rules  of the incorporation  of requirements,  the entrepreneur  should
disclose the personalizing mechanisms to lawfully use them when shaping
the agreement. Yet, this interpretation should be rejected, as the application
of personalization  mechanisms  should  be  seen  as part  of the process
of contract formation, not the contract itself.
The standard  contract  can  be  understood  as an agreement  for
an unlimited number of contracts23 or which provisions should be applied
in at least three legal relationships.24 Some scholars argue that the fact that
there has been only one contract concluded with the use of a set of terms
or that  these  terms  are  used  sporadically  impedes  classifying  them
as standard terms.25
However,  this  means  that  an important  role  in shaping  the nature
of a given statement is then left to luck. If the entrepreneur drafts a standard
contract  with the purpose  of applying it  repeatedly,  but  after  concluding
one agreement decides not to use it again, then this set of provisions will be
considered an individually imposed set of provisions, not standard terms.
Therefore, the premise ought to be understood as a set of norms prepared
to be  used  when  concluding  an unlimited  number  of contracts  with
an unlimited number of contractors. It is therefore enough that the standard
terms  were  designed  to be  used  repeatedly – their  factual  application  is
irrelevant.26
22 Rejdak, M. (2015) Op. cit., p. 127; Trzaskowski, R. (2018) In: Jacek Gudowski (ed.).  Kodeks
cywilny.  Komentarz.  Tom III.  Zobowiązania.  Część  ogólna. Warszawa: Wolters  Kluwer,  LEX
no 10698, Art. 384, point 20.
23 Zachariasiewicz,  M.  A.  (1995)  Niektóre  problemy  prawne  związane  z korzystaniem
z nienormatywnych wzorców umownych. Rejent, 9, p. 122.
24 Zoll, F. (1997) Potrzeba i kierunek nowelizacji kodeksowego ujęcia problematyki wzorców
umownych. Biuletyn Rady Legislacyjnej, 1, p. 90.
25 Rejdak, M. (2005) Op. cit., p. 117.
26 (2016) Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 1285/15, 9 November.  [online] Available from:
http://orzeczenia.waw.sa.gov.pl/details/$N/154500000003003_VI_ACa_001285_2015_Uz_
2016-11-09_002 [Accessed 11 December 2018].
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Nevertheless,  the fulfilment  of this  premise  in the case  of personalized
contracts is dubious. There are two possible scenarios: first,  segmentation-
-based personalization – which is the model frequently applied nowadays –
and second, triggered real-time adjustment. In the case of the segmentation
of profilees the same model of contract is applied to all members of a given
group. The larger the group is,  the more times a particular pattern will  be
used. In principle, the same pattern is used for mass contracting.
However, the above model constitutes a simplification and may become
obsolete  with  the development  of personalization  techniques.
If personalizing mechanisms are used to generate the contents of contracts,27
it  becomes  possible  to compile  standard  terms  for  each  consumer
individually on the basis of data contained in the entrepreneur's system.28
Personalization is  based  on the use  of electronic  tools  that  are  specific
reusable  algorithms.  Thus,  the mass  element  appears  in this  case  not
in reference to a particular set of terms but to the mechanism of its creation.
This  applies  to the consumer’s data, the collection of clauses and the code
used  to compose  pattern –  thus,  although  the outcome  differs,
the mechanism  of personalization  is  common  and  serves  for  the mass
conclusion of contracts.
As a result,  it  is  not the set of standard terms that is  applied for mass
contracting, but the mechanism of their creation.
2.3. SHAPING THE CONTENT OF CONTRACTS IN A UNIFORM 
WAY
Personalization  can  take  different  forms,  manifesting  in the manner
of concluding  the agreement  (e.g. bidding,  auction),  elements  related
to the form  of the offer,  its  content,  time  and  means  of communication
or lack thereof. If personalization concerns elements not related to shaping
the content  of the relationship,  which  arise  as a result  of the conclusion
of a personalized contract, it will not affect the classification of the contract.
Similarly,  if the personalization  affects  only  elements  individualising
the parties  or main  obligations  of the parties  (e.g. determination
27 On first-degree  price  discrimination:  Acquisti,  A.,  Taylor,  C.  and  Wagman,  L.  (2016)
The Economics of Privacy. Journal of Economic Literature, 52 (2), p. 466.
28 Similar  postulates  have  been  already offered  by C.  Busch  regarding  information  duties.
Busch,  C.  (2016)  The Future  of Pre-contractual  Information  Duties:  From  Behavioural
Insights to Big Data. In: Christian Twigg-Flesner (ed.).  Research Handbook on EU Consumer
and Contract  Law. Cheltenham,  UK,  Northampton,  MA,  USA:  Edward Elgar  Publishing,
pp. 221–241.
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of the price), it will be assumed that personalization did not cover standard
terms,  as these  can  never  include  individualising  elements.  Defining
an individual consumer or specifying the subject of the contract will always
have the character of an individually negotiated provision.29
Uniform  shaping  of the contract  template  means  that  it  will  define
the content  of future  contracts  identically,  in isolation  from  the specifics
of a particular  contractual  relationship.30 The aim  of using  personalizing
mechanisms is, however, to introduce individualization. If profiling results
in the creation of multi-person groups, a unified pattern can be used within
a given group. As long as the personalization creates only the appearance
of individualisation, it is reasonable to argue that personalized agreements
have uniform content and that they standardize contractual relationships.
The problem arises if entrepreneurs start mixing and changing clauses
depending  on the occurrence  of specific  characteristics  of the consumer.
The number of possible combinations of provisions can vary – theoretically,
every  consumer  might  be  treated  differently.  In this  case,  the thesis  that
personalized  contracts  lead  to the uniform  shaping  of the content
of contracts will be unjustifiable.
2.4. HYBRID CHARACTER OF THE PERSONALIZED 
AGREEMENT – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A certain  duality  of the personalized  agreement  is  to be  observed –  they
have characteristics of both individually negotiated contracts and standard
contracts.  The content  of personalized  agreements  is  shaped
by the entrepreneur – the consumer  has  no  real  impact  on the content
of commitment because he cannot negotiate it. At the same time, however,
the consumer’s  features  and  behaviour  have  a decisive  impact
on the content of the offer. The lack of traditional negotiations may be seen
as an element indicating the adhesive character of the contract, but it can be
argued that negotiations are becoming an anachronism – they are replaced
by profiling  tools,  which  are  supposed  to lead  to the same  effect
as negotiations between the parties.
A personalized offer can be single-use, but it can also be prepared to be
leveraged  on numerous  occasions,  depending  on the technology  used
29 Radwański, Z. (2003) Zobowiązania: część ogólna. 4th ed. Warszawa: C.H. Beck, p. 142.
30 (2011) Court of Appeal in Katowice, V ACa 546/11, 29 November.  [online] Available from:
https://www.katowice.sa.gov.pl/container/orzeczenia/V_ACa_546-11.pdf
[Accessed 11 December 2018].
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by the entrepreneur.  In the case  of personalization  through profiling,  it  is
possible  to observe  unification  within  a given  group  due  to the fact  that
personalization leads only to apparent individualization. The development
of personalization  mechanisms  can  result  in further  granularization
of personalized contracts – each might  be generated separately,  for every
single customer.
As a result,  it  is  impossible  to apply the norms of either  of the regimes
directly.  Due  to qualification  doubts,  as well  as the lack  of specific
normative regulation of personalized agreements, it is necessary to search
for  the optimal  solution,  having  in regard  the aim  of the legislator  when
regulating the relationship between the consumer and the business – that is,
the need to diminish the undesired effect of contractual inequality between
these parties.
Considering  the need  to protect  the consumer,  it  would  be  advisable
to allow  the per  analogiam application  of norms  regulating  adhesive
agreements,  as this  regime  provides  higher  protection  then  rules
on individually negotiated contracts or unilaterally imposed provisions. It
sets strict  rules on incorporation of standards terms (it  shall  be delivered
to it  prior  to the conclusion  of the contract  and,  if in an electronic  form,  it
shall  be  made  available  to the other  party  prior  to the conclusion
of the contract in such a manner that the latter is able to store and retrieve
the template  in the regular  course  of actions31).  It  impedes  positioning
the quality  of service  or product  below  the average  without  drawing
consumers  attention  to that  particular  provision.32 Finally,  it  battles
disproportionality  within  rights  and  obligations  of the parties
by implementing general, standardized protection.33
3. PERSONALIZATION PROCESS FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF UNFAIR COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES FRAMEWORK
The UCPD has been implemented into Polish law by the Act on Competition
and Consumer Protection and the Act on Counteracting Unfair Market Practices
31 Art. 384 § 1, 4 PCC.
32 Zoll, F. (2012) Problem negatywnego uzgodnienia cech rzeczy sprzedanej – w oczekiwaniu
na wspólne europejskie prawo sprzedaży. Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego, 2, pp. 167–174.
33 Rules  on exploitation  (Art. 388  PCC),  unfair  terms  and  unexpected  clauses  regulation
(Art. 3851-4 PCC), Luzak, J. (2017) You too will be judged:  erga omnes effect of registered
unfair  contract  terms  in Poland. Journal  of European  Consumer  and  Market  Law,  6 (3),
pp. 120–124.
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(ACUMP).  The latter,  in accordance  with  the implemented  directive,
provides a general definition of unfair  market  practice – a practice  that is
contrary  to good  morals,  interpreted  as opposing  the requirements
of professional  diligence34 and materially distorts or is  likely to materially
distort  the market  behaviour  of the average  consumer  with  regard
to the product.  Therefore,  this  regulation  addresses  the issue  of the
permissibility  of the personalization  method  that  leads  to a certain  result
e.g. a personalized marketing technique or a personalized offer.
Though  this  definition  seems  broad  and  irrespective  of technology
applied,  there  are  certain  issues  that  make  protecting  consumers  from
the undue  influence  of entrepreneurs  less  effective  in the personalized
online environment.
It  can  be  doubted  whether  an individual  activity  of an entrepreneur –
e.g. addressing  a consumer  with  an individually  tailored  offer –  can  be
considered a market practice. This interpretation has been rejected. Market
practice means, among other things, a statement or piece of information that
could  take  form  of a single  action.35 The UCPD  does  not  contain  any
indication  that  the act  or omission  on the part  of the professional  must  be
recurrent or must concern more than one consumer.36
The weakness  of the protection  lies  in the standardization  of premises.
The point of reference is an average consumer,37 yet the personalization uses
strategies  that  correspond with  the individual  addressee’s  characteristics.
A person  with  a strong  authority  bias,  heavily  influenced  by the fear
of being  excluded,  who  applied  to a certain  university,  views
an advertisement  where  a person  dressed  as a dentist  presents  study
according  to which  70 %  of students  from  this  university  have  already
benefited from the newest teeth-whitening treatment. Personalization opens
the possibility  for  adjusting  a marketing  technique  to a set  of particular
incentives  this  person is  likely  to react  to.38 Such  a combined message  is
highly  persuasive  in this  specific  case,  and significantly  less  effective  for
34 Stefanicki, R. (2009)  Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym. Komentarz.
Warszawa: LexisNexis Polska, LEX no 10064, Art. 4, point 1.
35 Polski Związek Firm Deweloperskich v. Prezes UOKiK (2010) SOKiK (Court of Competition and
Consumer Protection) 25 March, No XVII Ama 43/09, Dziennik Urzędowy UOKiK, 3, p. 104.
36 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. UPC Magyarország Kft. (2015) TSUE. No. C-388/13, § 42.
37 As worded in Art. 2 point 8, Art. 4. 1., Art. 5. 1., Art. 6. 1., Art. 8. 1. ACUMP in accordance
with motive 18, Art. 5.2.b., Art. 6.1 and 2, Art. 7.1 and 2, Art. 8 UCPD.
38 Calo, R. (2014) Digital Market Manipulation. The George Washington Law Review, 82, pp. 996,
999, 1010.
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other  customers.39 Therefore,  the practice  cannot  be  considered  likely
to materially  distort  the market  behaviour  of the average  consumer.
If the point  of reference  remains  standardized,  the protection  mechanism
will fail to cover such individualized practices.
Another  issue  is  drawing  a line  between  sophisticated,  persuasive
marketing techniques and unfair market practices.  Personalization means
processing  data  on a consumer,  which  allows  for  determining  his
weaknesses,  complexes,  fears  and  behavioural  biases.40 This  allows
entrepreneurs  to put  the consumer  under  pressure  in a manner  which
strongly  limits  the consumer’s  ability  to make  an informed  decision.
In certain situations, mechanisms based on persuasion can exert an undue
pressure  on the person,41 which  opens  the possibility  of classifying  such
behaviour  as an aggressive  practice.  Can  personalization  significantly
impair  the consumer’s  ability  to make an autonomous  decision –  limiting
his  freedom  of choice?  Can  entrepreneurial  practices  cause  someone
to make a contractual decision which they would not have made otherwise?
Answering  these  questions  depends  primarily  on the results  of empirical
research  on consumer  behaviour  towards  personalized  content.42
In practice,  a deep  ad  casu analysis  of the effectiveness  of a particular
personalization tool would be needed – requiring access to personalization
mechanisms,  data  on users,  the results  of personalization,  user  feedback
and  information  on factual  customer  responses  and  data  how  the  fair
personalization –  matching  the needs  and  situations,  not  abusing
weaknesses –  influences  the consumer's  tendency  to make  certain
contractual decisions.
In addition,  frequently,  personalization  means  matching  pressure
to one’s  weaknesses.  The consumer  is  not  misled  in regards
to the characteristics  of the product,  nor  coerced  into  concluding
an agreement.  The entrepreneur  manipulates  him  by providing
personalized content, without disclosing information on the personalization
39 Wagner, G. and Eidenmüller H. (2019) Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting
Biases,  and Shaping Preferences:  Regulating  the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions.
The University of Chicago Law Review, 86, p. 594.
40 Ibid, pp. 593–594.
41 Schulze,  R.  and  Schulte-Nölke,  H.  (2003)  Analysis  of National  Fairness  Laws  Aimed
at Protecting  Consumers  in Relation  to Commercial  Practices  (Report  Commissioned
by the European  Commission,  DG  Sanco),  p. 37.  [online] Available  from:  https://lirias.
kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/204413/1/unfair_practices_en.pdf [Accessed 12 December
2018].
42 Ibid.
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process itself. As a result, only the nudges that amount to undue influence
and  as such  preclude  free  decision-making  or contain  misleading
information  may  be  considered  unfair  commercial  practices  according
to the UCPD.43 The more  conscious  the consumers  are  of the practice,
the more substantial nudging could be allowed.
As a rule, the subject to control is a specific practice of the entrepreneur
in isolation  from  his  other  actions  not  a set  of coordinated  practices
a customer  is  faced  with.44 However,  in the online  environment,
the behaviours of the entrepreneur can be combined, which increases their
effectiveness.45 Each practice  assessed separately might  not  be influential
enough to materially distort the consumer’s behaviour, yet, if it is designed
to correlate  with  others,  the impact  of the whole  mechanism  grows.
An example  can  be  the case  of a person  fighting  obesity  and  a donut
advertisement. Provided that the message about the new promotion of his
favourite donuts reaches him at the time when he used to have snack break
at work  and  mentions  the nearby  bakery,  the temptation  would  be
considerably stronger than if the advertisement was not personalized.
Hence,  it  would be  recommended to adopt a broader  approach when
assessing the character  of a practice  in question – taking into account also
other  practices  of the entrepreneur  and  assessing  the influence
of the practice  bundle  on a consumer.  As well  current  point  of reference
being an average consumer, though sufficient in case of segmentation-based
personalization,  might  not  maintain  its  functionality  in the era
of personalization. However, changes in this regard might not be necessary
as here  the individual  protection  mechanisms  of defects  of consent  come
into play (especially institution of mistake, fraud and threat).
4. INITIATION OF THE PERSONALIZATION PROCESS
The third  group  of norms  is  aimed  at regulating  the acceptability  of use
of personalization  mechanisms –  constituting  the legal  requirements  for
43 Brownsword, R. (2018) The E-Commerce Directive, Consumer Transactions, and the Digital
Single  Market –  Questions  of Regulatory  Fitness,  Regulatory  Disconnection  and  Rule
Redirection. In: Stefan Grundmann (ed.).  European Contract Law in Digital Age. Cambridge,
Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, p. 187.
44 Nevertheless, when assessing whether the market practice is aggressive, all its features and
circumstances  of placing  the product  on the market  should  be  considered,  in particular
time,  place,  type  of a given  practice  or the intentional  use  by the entrepreneur
of a compulsory  location  of the consumer  or other  circumstances  which  limit
the consumer's  ability  to make  an informed  decision  regarding  the contract.  See  Art. 8.3
ACUMP.
45 Brownsword, R. (2018) Op. cit., pp. 165–172; Calo, R. (2014) Op. cit., pp. 995–1017.
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lawful  personalization  processes.  It  is  commonly  accepted  that  data
protection  laws  apply  to personalized  pricing.46 Though  what  justifies
the application of the norms of the GDPR is the processing of personal data,
up until now, the research focused on one aspect of personalization – price
personalization.  The same  observations  can  be  made  in the case
of personalization leading to other results. The use of personalization itself
might  make the entrepreneur subject  to the GDPR,  regardless of the effect
of this process.
The first  premise  of the application  of the GDPR  is  the processing
of personal  data.  According  to Art. 4 (2)  of the GDPR,  nearly  all
the activities  which  can  be  exercised  over  personal  data  fall  within  this
scope.  Therefore,  any  operation  or set  of operations  which  is  performed
on personal  data  during  personalization  or with  the objective
of personalization,  including  storing  or analysing  data,  constitute
the processing of personal data.
Personal  data  encompasses  any  information  relating  to an identified
or identifiable  natural  person  [Art. 4 (2)  GDPR].  There  are  two  main
scenarios  to consider –  a registered  consumer  case  and  a non-registered
consumer  case.  In the first,  the profilee  provides  the data  knowingly  and
voluntarily during the registration process. Subsequently, his activities are
monitored  and this  data  supplements  the information  within  his  profile.
As a result,  all  the information  that  is  gathered  on such  a profile  is
considered personal data. The qualification of data processed in the second
situation  is  not  that  clear.  A user  that  is  not  registered  nor  signed-in
as a rule will not be identified in a traditional manner. Nevertheless, there
are  other  ways  of identifying  him  each  time  he  accesses  the web –
e.g. a cookie-identifier.  The actions he takes in the online environment can
be tracked and saved on his unique profile. This method allows for singling
out  a particular  person,  therefore  the gathered  profile  data  is  considered
personal  data  despite  the  lack  of information  traditionally  used  for
individualisation  (e.g. name,  login).47 Doubts  emerge  in the case
of information that is not per se connected to the user’s identity and is used
46 Steppe, R. (2017) Online price discrimination and personal data: A General Data Protection
Regulation  perspective.  Computer  Law  & Security  Review,  33,  pp. 768–785;  Zuiderveen
Borgesius,  F.J.,  Poort,  J.P.  (2017) Online Price Discrimination and EU Data Privacy Law.
Journal of Consumer Policy, 40 (3), p. 356; Borocz, I. (2015) Op. cit., pp. 50–52.
47 Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.J. and Poort, J.P. (2017)  Op. cit., p. 357; Article 29. Working Party
2010 Opinion 2/2010 on Online behavioural advertising (WP 171) 22 June 2010; Judgement
of 19  October  2016,  Breyer,  Case  C-582/14,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:779  regarding  a dynamic  IP
address.
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for  segmentation  purposes –  e.g. the fact  that  the person  uses  an Apple
device.  At the moment  in which  this  data  is  connected  to the profile
of a particular  person,  it  becomes  personal  data,  as it  becomes  related
to an identified natural person.
Personal data should be processed in accordance with the requirements
of the GDPR – that is, inter alias, fairly, lawfully and transparently.
In the case  of personalization  during  the pre-contractual  stage
in the private  sector,  there  might  be  three  legal  grounds  for  processing
personal data: the data subject has given consent (Art. 6a GDPR), processing
is necessary for the performance of a contract  (Art. 6b GDPR) or there are
legitimate interests of the controller involved (Art. 6f GDPR). The doctrine48
rejects  the two latter  grounds.  The premise  that  the data  is  necessary  for
the performance  of a contract  or because  of legitimate  interests
of the entrepreneur  is  understood  narrowly;  neither  the fact  that
the processing  of this  data  may maximise  the profits  of the processor  nor
the circumstance that the company sees this data as useful while developing
its marketing strategies falls within their scope.49
Can  Art. 6b  and  6f  constitute  grounds  for  personalization  aiming
at different results? In the case of personalization that brings about results
predominantly beneficial  for  the business  but  not bound to the obligation
of the entrepreneur  (e.g. not  sending  offers  to low-spenders  or consumers
who  often  exercise  their  right  to withdraw),  as a rule  the processing
of personalized  data  should  not  be  seen  by Data  Protection  Authorities
as necessary,  as there  are  other  ways  to maximize  profits.  In addition,
the consumer’s  interests  and  rights  (especially  their  right  to privacy)
override the company’s interests in this scenario.50
Similarly,  processing  enables  the professional  to address  individual
characteristics of the consumer in a way that is  beneficial  for both (e.g. no
cosmetics  containing  substance  X  are  advertised  to an individual  who  is
allergic  to this  particular  ingredient).  However,  the fact  that  such
personalization  also  benefits  the consumer  is  irrelevant51 when assessing
realization of the premises of Art. 6f. The interests of the consumer should
48 Steppe, R. (2017) Prijsdiscriminatie in het digitale tijdperk: Beschouwingen over de nieuwe
algemene  verordening  gegevensbescherming.  In:  Matthias  E.  Storme,  Werner  F.  Helsen
(eds.),  Innovatie  en disruptie  in het  economisch  recht. Antwerpen:  Intersentia,  pp. 105–149;
Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.J. and Poort, J.P. (2017) Op. cit., p. 360. Argumentation formulated
in regard to price discrimination.
49 Kuner, C. (2007)  European data protection law. Corporate Compliance and Regulation.  2nd ed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 234–235.
50 Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.J. and Poort, J.P. (2017) Op. cit., p. 360.
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be  taken  into  account  but  not  as a positive  premise  allowing  for
personalization but as a negative one – if there are interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal
data  that  override  legitimate  interests  pursued  by the controller
or by a third  party,  Art. 6f  GDPR  cannot  constitute  grounds  for  such
processing. Art. 6f should not be then interpreted as: if there are interests
or fundamental  rights  and freedoms of the data  subject  whose protection
requires  processing  of personal  data,  the controller  or the third  party  is
authorized to process this data despite the lack of other legal grounds for
processing (e.g. Art. 6d).
The most  controversial  situation  appears  when  the processing
of personal  data  is  beneficial  for  the entrepreneur  but  also  constitutes
an optimal  manner  of fulfilling  legal  obligation,  e.g. enables
the entrepreneur to assess the risk of the other party evading the obligation
(e.g.  the person  is  included  in the national  debtors'  register).  Here,
a legitimate  interest  of the administrator  lies  in compliance  with
the requirement  of due  diligence  when  selecting  a contractor.
The processing of personal data might be considered necessary to achieve
the objective resulting from the aforementioned interest – processing data
on users  is  the core  instrument  that  allows  for  diminishing  anonymity
within  the online  environment  and reducing  transaction  risks.  However,
accepting  this  argumentation  leads  to the following  conclusion:
personalization  should  be  allowed  in e-commerce  in every  case,  as it  is
the best  solution  for  reducing  anonymity  and  enhancing  trust  online.
Consequently, the consumer is practically stripped of the protection granted
by GDPR. Therefore, in this scenario, the entrepreneur’s interests (to apply
the most  suited  tools  to fulfil  his  legal  obligation)  should  be  considered
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject (mainly right to privacy).
Consequently,  the only  ground  for  processing  personal  data  for
the personalization  in the private  sector  should  be  the informed  consent
of the data  subject.  The data  subject  should  be  given  clear  and
comprehensive information about purposes of processing before consenting
to be its subject – e.g. before cookies are saved on his device. Furthermore,
the purpose cannot be only vaguely or generally described (e.g. “improving
51 Lubasz,  D.  and  Chomiczewski,  W.  (2018)  In:  Dominik  Lubasz  (ed.).  RODO.  Ogólne
rozporządzenie o ochronie danych. Komentarz. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, LEX no 10655, Art. 6
point 7.3.
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user’s  experience”  or “enhancing  personalized  experience  of user”),  but
must  be  stated  clearly  and  accurately52 so that  the data  subject  can
understand  the intended  results  of the personalization  (e.g. “personalized
pricing” or “inaccessibility of offers not corresponding with profile”).
The personalization  of offers  might  fall  under  the scope  of Art. 22
of the GDPR,  as  it  can  elicit  fully  automated  decisions  with  far-reaching
effects.53 This  provision  attributes  a person  the right  not  to be  subject
to a decision  based  solely  on automated  processing,  including  profiling,
which  produces  legal  effects  concerning  him  or otherwise  significantly
affects  him.  Personalized  pricing  fulfils  these  premises –  (i) an algorithm
decides  on a price  for  a particular  customer,  (ii) in a fully  automated
manner,  (iii) using  personal  data  to evaluate  the consumer’s  willingness
to pay. (iv) It affects his legal situation because the determination of a price
gives the final shape to his contractual obligation.54
The observations made regarding price personalization remain valid for
other types of personalization. (i) Personalization mechanisms are designed
to result in a decision regarding an individual person, yet their content may
differ  substantially  depending  on the functionality  of the system
(segmentation  effect  only,  choice  of manner  and time  of contact,  content
or form  of offer).  (ii) The algorithms  used  for  personalization  automate
certain processes; in the case of Big Data analysis of consumer data, human
intervention is per se unnecessary, except for the instances in which the code
is  being  revised  or changed.  (iii) The personalization  mechanisms  work
on personal data. (iv) The use of personalization mechanisms, no matter the
aim of their particular usage, has a legal effect on the person – it alters his
legal situation.
Firstly,  the intent  of personalization  towards  the consumer  triggers
the GDPR  general  protection.  Secondly,  it  complicates  the verification
of compliance  of the process  with  the requirements  of the UCPD,  while
enabling  the entrepreneur  to influence  the behaviour  of a consumer
to an unprecedented  degree.  Thirdly,  it  alters  the scope  of the legitimate
expectations  of the consumer,  as building  trust  towards  an entrepreneur
becomes  the main  goal  of personalization.  Finally,  it  may  also  alter
52 Art. 5.1(b) GDPR.
53 Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.J. and Poort, J.P. (2017) Op. cit., p. 361.
54 Subsumption model presented by: Mendoza, I.  and Bygrave,  L. A. (2017).  The Right  Not
to Be  Subject  to Automated  Decisions  Based  on Profiling.  [online] Available  from:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964855 [Accessed 12 December 2018].
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the mechanism  of decoding  the content  of a contract  as the information
processed  within  the entrepreneur’s  systems  on the subjective  aim
of the consumer  should  be  taken  into  account  when  assessing
the performance of the obligation by the professional.
As a result  in each  case  of personalization,  the data  subject  should  be
given  meaningful  information  about  the logic  involved,  as well
as the significance  and the envisaged consequences  of such processing for
the data subject (Art. 13.2f and 14.2f GDPR). However, the fulfilment of this
requirement  may  be  problematic.  It  can  be  argued  that  the specifics
of personalization  mechanisms  constitute  company  secrets,  and  even
if the company was willing to reveal this information, it might be difficult
to explain the reasoning of self-learning tools.
4.1. WEAKNESSES OF THE CONSENT BASED PROTECTION 
IN GDPR
Despite  the novelty  of the solution  proposed  within  the GDPR,  there  are
certain factors that undermine the functionality of this protective model.
Consent-based  protection  against  use  of personalization  mechanisms
towards a person55 constitutes  a variation  of the protection  by information
model.56 It is  believed that with access to the data, the data subject (being
the consumer in most cases) is able to make an informed, rational decision
even  when  dealing  with  a significantly  stronger  entity.  Providing
the consumer with easy access to information should be enough to balance
information asymmetries and thus prevent this person from being abused
or tricked into  an unfavourable  contract –  it  is  assumed that  this  person,
with all the information at hand, will not agree to exploitation.
However, this protection model has flaws that impair its functionality,
especially  in the online  environment.  From  the economic  analysis  of law
perspective,  the major issues are the cognitive limitations of the addresses
of information,57 the costs of its processing and the significant disproportion
between  the costs  of reading  and  understanding  information  and
the benefits  of gaining  this  knowledge.58 A person aware  of her  cognitive
55 In this model an informed consent constitutes lawful ground for data processing. Busch, C.
(2019) Op. cit., pp. 310–311.
56 Busch, C. (2016) Op. cit., pp. 222–224.
57 Calo, R. (2014) Op. cit., pp. 1000–1001.
58 Mikłaszewicz,  P.  (2008)  Op.  cit.,  pp. 62–63;  Luzak,  J.  (2015)  Online  Disclosure  Rules
of the Consumer  Rights  Directive:  Protecting  Passive  or Active  Consumers?.  Journal
of European Consumer and Market Law, 4 (3), p. 82.
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limitations  is  not  willing  to make  an effort  which  will  most  likely  fail
to improve the situation or expand her knowledge. The average consumer
has neither  the expertise  on the subject  of the contract,  nor  the knowledge
of the law to allow an accurate interpretation of all provisions in a standard
contract.  Internet  tools  enable  the consumer  to diminish  the influence
of these factors,  as they automate the comparison of content  and facilitate
the search  for  important  pieces  of information.  However,  they  do  not
compensate for the increasing amount of data that the consumer is exposed
to as a consequence of every click online.59
The GDPR  consent-based  protection  resulted  in a multiplication
of the information  the consumer  is  presented  with  at the pre-contractual
stage.  From  the legislators’  perspective,  an individual  should  be  given
detailed  and  specific  information  on the processing  of his  personal  data
before consenting to processing – that is, before he can familiarize himself
with  the content  he  is  looking  for.  This  means  that  most  actions  taken
by the consumer  online  will  trigger  a consent  request.  Then  more
information  appear –  e.g. the pre-contractual  information  demanded
by the consumer  rights  directive.  This  inevitably  leads  to information
overload.60
This  critical  point  of information  overload  comes  surprisingly  fast
in the case of online transactions. Behavioural studies show that the above is
due  to the intensity  of the exposure  to data,  the conviction  of the personal
irrelevancy of the information presented and that the information is already
known  (assumption  of repeatability  of the information  within  pop-ups
of certain kind) and the abundance of distractions within this environment
and outside of it (short attention span).61
Last but not least, some undesirable entrepreneur behaviour models are
observed.  The main  problem  is  the “take-it-or-leave-it”  approach.
The consumer that does not agree to the processing of his personal data is
automatically denied access to the website or has to pay for it. The Internet’s
implied characteristic is the coexistence of numerous sites offering the same
content/services and competing for users. This predication loses its accuracy
in the case of sales portals or sharing economy portals; these tend to merge
59 Busch, C. (2019) Op. cit., pp. 330–331.
60 Busch, C. (2019) Op. cit., p. 322.
61 Południak-Gierz,  K.  (2017)  From  Information  Asymmetry  to Information  Overload –
Technological  Society  of Consumers.  In:  Patrícia  Kaplánová  (ed.).  Contemporary  issues
of societal development. Novo mesto, pp. 31–47.
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and  concentrate  the majority  of online  traffic  within  a certain  market
(e.g. Airbnb,  Uber,  Amazon, Polish  Allegro). Therefore, the decision to avoid
one  portal  causes  a similar  result  to the overall  resignation  from  access
to a specific Internet market.
4.2. POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS OF GDPR’S CONSENT-BASED 
PROTECTION MODEL
Principles  present  in GDPR (core principles  of legitimacy,  proportionality
and legality as well as limitation purpose) set an adequate benchmark for
the data protection regulation.  However, in case of personalization within
consumer e-commerce, the fact that the legal ground of processing of data is
the consent  of the data  subject  might  limit  GDPR’s  practical  impact.
Nevertheless,  the effectiveness  of the current  informed  consent-based
protection model of GDPR can be increased.
The first,  albeit  temporary,  approach  aims  at limiting  the amount
of information the data subject is provided with before the commencement
of personalization. It requires empirical research on the reasons consumers
fear  and  reject  personalization.  According  to recent  studies,  the most
problematic  issue  concerns price  discrimination,62 yet  the matter  requires
further  investigation.  The solution  might  be  to expressly  inform
the consumer  only  about  the typical  most  unwanted  aspects
of personalization and provide a way to access extra information.
Another  option,  though  rather  practical  then  legal,  would  be  to let
the current  regulation  operate  but  encourage the members  of the Internet
society  to “name  and  shame”63 –  that  is,  to investigate  which  entities
processing data are not in line with the requirements of the GDPR, exercise
especially  user-unfriendly  profiling  or implement  personalization  not
in order to adjust the offer to the needs and characteristics of the consumers,
but  to exploit  false  convictions  and  trick  them  into  less  favourable
contracts.64
62 Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.J. and Poort, J.P. (2017) Op. cit.; Borocz, I. (2015) Op. cit., p. 37.
63 This  model  is  based  on the assumption  that  Internet  societies  have  significant  self-
-regulatory potential.  Poullet,  Y.  (2002)  How To Regulate  Internet:  New  Paradigms  For
Internet Governance Self-Regulation: Value And Limits. In: Claire Monville (ed.). Variations
sur  le  droit  de  la  société  de  l'information.  Bruxelles:  Bruylant,  pp. 84–91.  [online]  Available
from: http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/4656.pdf [Accessed  2  May  2019];  Schultz,  T.  (2008)
Carving  up the Internet:  Jurisdiction,  Legal  Orders,  and  the Private/Public  International
Law Interfaces. The European Journal of International Law, 19 (4), pp. 829–837.
64 On misperceptions: Bar-Gill, O. (2019) Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is
A Function  Of Both  Preferences  And  (Mis)Perceptions.  University  of Chicago  Law  Review,
86 (2), pp. 228–232; Calo, R. (2014) Op. cit., pp. 1003–1017.
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It is also worth considering imposing default standards on entities using
personalization.65 Forbidding  or limiting  the use  of Big  Data  for
personalization  (e.g. banning  price  discrimination)  might  be  equally
harmful  to consumer  interests66 so  this  would  require  in-depth  research
on the functioning of personalization mechanisms.  Another issue is  that if
norms are set in legislative procedure they might quickly become outdated,
as the development speed of technological and marketing techniques makes
it difficult to set technologically insensitive norms. Some solutions might be
to link  the standards  to other  values  (entrepreneurs  should  not  ask  for
consent to use data in a way that is against contractual fairness, but simply
refrain  from doing  so),  to attribute  the responsibility  for  data  processing
to the visible  entities  and  to implement  privacy-enhancing  technology
(e.g. a browser’s default settings should not allow for identifying its user).
Nevertheless,  general  clauses  based  protection  is  not  optimal  in the case
of B2C relations.
The newest  proposition  is  based  on the idea  of the personalization
of laws regarding personalization.67 The matter was investigated in regard
to personalized pricing. The use of personalized price caps was proposed,
which  could  diminish  the effect  of misperception  on consumers’
willingness-to-pay.68 Another option was to personalize information duties
based on the use of personalization – the information should precisely name
the gains  and  losses  of personalization  used  by the trader.  In the case
of personalized  pricing,  that  would  be  information  on the true  value
of the product  towards  a particular  consumer.69 The main  weakness
of the solution  is  the lack  of incentive  for  the entrepreneur  to eliminate
the misperception-based  component  of the willingness-to-pay.70 Secondly,
the personalization  of law,  though  alluring,  poses  a serious  threat
of uncontrollable  free  discretion  in deciding  on the legal  rights  and
obligations of market participants, diminishing legal certainty.71
65 Busch, C. (2019) Op. cit., pp. 323–324.
66 Bar-Gill, O. (2019) Op. cit., pp. 223, 242.
67 Ibid.
68 Bar-Gill, O. (2019) Op. cit., pp. 223, 243–244.
69 Porat, A. and Strahilevitz, L. J. (2014) Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big
Data. Michigan Law Review, 112, pp. 1417–1421; Bar-Gill, O. (2019) Op. cit., p. 244.
70 Bar-Gill, O. (2019) Op.cit., p. 244.
71 Południak-Gierz,  K.  (2017)  Dangers  and benefits  of personalisation  in Contract  Law:  big
data approach. Queen Mary Law Journal, Special Conference Issue: Autumn, pp. 25–36.
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5. MODERN EU PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS VERSUS 
TRADITIONAL NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS – 
EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
The use  of personalization  algorithms  in shaping  offers  does  not  pass
unnoticed  by legal  systems,  even in instances  when personalization  itself
in not  expressly  dealt  with  in legal  provisions.  The reaction  towards
personalization  can  be  observed  on different  levels:  when  assessing
lawfulness of data processing within entrepreneur’s tools, setting the point
of reference for a fair process of personalization so that it does not become
an unfair market practice and at the stage of interpretation of personalized
contract. Theoretically, presented legal framework covers the most obvious
issues  related  to the use  of personalization  mechanism  during  shaping
an offer. However, the efficiency of these sets of rules differ.
Polish  contract  law –  mostly  rules  on standard  contracts –  combats
the undesired  results  of personalization  by influencing  the content
of a contract concluded with the use of personalization mechanisms. These
mechanisms  are  not  designed  to protect  entities  from  disloyal  use
of personalization mechanisms but  they reduce the contractual  imbalance
caused by limited autonomy of the weaker party (usually the consumer). It
happens  regardless  of methodology  used  to force,  trick  or convince
to conclude the agreement of such wording. As a result, they maintain their
functionality also in case of personalized agreements.
Provisions  of ACUMP  as well  as GDPR  aim  at granting  ex-ante
protection.  The mechanism  used  in ACUMP  (prevention  of infringement
caused by the improper conduct of the entrepreneur) is being supplemented
with  an information  protection  mechanism  (consent  requirement).
The tendency to stretch protection towards the pre-contractual stage in EU
law demonstrates the preventive approach of the legislator. However these
instruments have certain weaknesses that might reduce their effectiveness.
In case  of protection  granted  by provisions  on unfair  market  practices
the main issue is standardization of the point of reference. It impedes taking
into account subjective peculiarities of a particular case that limit autonomy
of this consumer – and the power of personalization is bestowed precisely
in addressing these elements. Also, it might not be a singular practice that
limits the autonomy of a person but the frequency and correlation between
the practices.  These  features  are  not  adequately  addressed  by the current
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regulation  and  therefore,  the effectiveness  of protection  granted  within
ACUMP in case of personalization mechanism is limited.
In comparison,  the newly  introduced  protective  mechanism  of GDPR,
designed  as an answer  to big  data  technology,  is  founded  upon  old
protective assumptions. As a result, this protection model is burdened with
the flaws  of the old  protection-by-information  regime.  In conclusion,
applicable  ex  post  national  protective  regulations  remain  vital  for
the protection  of consumers  concluding  personalized  agreements,
as the protection systems offered by the ACUMP and GDPR seem leaky and
not adequate in the era of personalized consumer contracts.
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